Trang chủInternational FootballFeyenoord sold five starters and still lost €12.6m: reading the cash flow of a stepping-stone club
International Football

Feyenoord sold five starters and still lost €12.6m: reading the cash flow of a stepping-stone club

Trả lời cốt lõi: Feyenoord công bố khoản lỗ ròng 12,6 triệu euro trong năm tài chính vừa qua dù đã bán năm trụ cột, nguyên nhân chính là doanh thu từ các giải đấu châu Âu sụt giảm mạnh sau khi đội dừng chân ở vòng đấu hạng UEFA Europa League, trong khi chi phí hoạt động gần như không đổi. Dữ kiện chính: - Doanh thu đạt 115,2 triệu euro, giảm 51,5 triệu euro so với năm trước. - Lỗ hoạt động ở mức 25,7 triệu euro, chi phí hoạt động gần như không đổi. - Kết quả bồi thường chuyển nhượng dương 9,4 triệu euro, nhưng không đủ bù lỗ. - Lỗ ròng sau lãi vay và thuế là 12,6 triệu euro. - Vốn chủ sở hữu bị giảm xuống còn 24,7 triệu euro. - Năm cầu thủ được bán: Dávid Hancko, Igor Paixão, Quilindschy Hartman, Antoni Milambo, Quinten Timber. - Feyenoord đứng nhì Eredivisie và giành suất dự UEFA Champions League. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Nguồn: Báo cáo tài chính thường niên của Feyenoord, được Goal.com đưa tin; số liệu đối chiếu với cơ sở dữ liệu VuaBong.vn. Hỏi đáp liên quan: Q: Vì sao Feyenoord lỗ dù đã bán nhiều cầu thủ? A: Vì doanh thu từ cúp châu Âu giảm hơn 50 triệu euro khi đội xuống chơi ở vòng đấu hạng Europa League thay vì vòng 1/8 Champions League, và khoản lãi chuyển nhượng 9,4 triệu euro không đủ bù. Q: Khoản lãi chuyển nhượng 9,4 triệu euro có phải tiền mặt không? A: Không, đây là lãi kế toán sau khi trừ khấu hao giá trị hợp đồng, và các thương vụ thường được trả góp nhiều đợt kèm phụ phí thành tích. Q: Vốn chủ sở hữu 24,7 triệu euro có đáng lo không? A: Đây là tấm đệm mỏng so với doanh thu 115,2 triệu euro; theo Chỉ số Độ sâu Đội hình của VangBong.vn, biên an toàn chỉ đủ cho một mùa giải tồi tệ, không phải hai.

9.4 million euros. That is the profit Feyenoord recorded from transfer activity in the financial year just published. Directly beneath it, in the same balance sheet, sits an operating loss of 25.7 million euros. The two lines sit a few centimetres apart on the page, but the gap between them is the real story: a club that sold five first-team pillars, brought in a sum its board described as substantial, and still ended the year with a net loss of 12.6 million euros. I sat at my desk in Paris, opened the annual report Feyenoord published, read it once, then read it a second time. That habit was formed long ago, in the autumn of 2026, when I was a 23-year-old editorial assistant at Radio France Bleu Paris. That day I put out a short bulletin saying Ronaldinho was about to join Manchester United, based on an article I had not verified. It was wrong. Seventeen complaint calls came in that evening. That night I wrote a one-page apology and promised myself one thing: France Bleu taught me a lesson, nothing goes on air unverified. Since then, every time I hold a financial report in my hands, I read it the way an investigative reporter reads a case file, not the way a supporter reads a news feed. Feyenoord's report is the kind of document I like: dry, specific, with figures, dates, and a named person accountable for it. Finance director Pieter Smorenburg signed the explanation. There is no room for rumour. Only money flowing in and money flowing out, and my question is always the same: you do not need to listen to rumours to read a deal, you only need to follow where the money goes. A season seen from two sides Before dissecting the numbers, they need to be placed in their proper frame. What is Feyenoord in the wider picture of European football? It is a club from Rotterdam, one of the three traditional powers of Dutch football alongside Ajax and PSV. The De Kuip stadium is one of those cathedrals that still carries the old breath of continental football, where the singing of the stands feels like a ritual rather than a performance. In reputation, Feyenoord belongs to the group of names with deep history; financially, it sits on an entirely different tier from the giants of the Premier League, La Liga or the Bundesliga. In the season reflected in the report, Feyenoord finished second in the Eredivisie and secured a place in the UEFA Champions League. That is a respectable sporting result. Yet alongside it, the financial picture carried a very different tone: revenue fell sharply, the operating loss widened, and equity was thinned. A team that plays well and a balance sheet that looks bad can coexist in the same year, and Feyenoord is a living example of exactly that. I remember sitting in a small café near the Marais to watch Feyenoord play in Europe, with a few Dutch freelance friends. They told me something I wrote down: in the Netherlands, we do not compete with Real Madrid with money, we compete with our eye. That sentence is the key to the whole financial story of Feyenoord. A club like this cannot live on broadcast rights or domestic television money, because the Dutch market is too small. It has to live on two other sources: prize money from European competitions, and profit from selling players. Mapping the cash flow: where 115.2 million euros goes Feyenoord's revenue in the reported financial year was 115.2 million euros. Compared with the previous year, revenue fell by 51.5 million euros. This is the starting point of any analysis, and also the point the media usually skips because it is not sensational enough. Losing more than 50 million euros of revenue is a major shock for a club of Feyenoord's size, equivalent to nearly a third of total revenue vanishing in a single year. What matters is locating where the money went. According to the report, the main cause was a sharp fall in revenue from European competitions. In other words, the money did not disappear from domestic operations; it disappeared from the continental stage. And when the European money disappears, the club's entire cost structure begins to shake. While revenue plunged, operating costs stayed virtually unchanged. This is the detail I want to dwell on, because it is the essence of the problem. A club can cut costs quickly when revenue falls, but Feyenoord could not. The player wage bill, stadium operating costs, the coaching apparatus, the academy, all of those commitments were made in advance and are hard to cut in the short term. The result is an operating loss that climbed to 25.7 million euros. At this point someone unused to reading financial reports will ask: if they sold five players, where did the transfer money go? The answer lies in the line for the compensation fee result: plus 9.4 million euros. This is an accounting profit, calculated after deducting the amortisation of the contract values of players bought earlier and related costs. It does not mean the club pocketed 9.4 million euros in cash during the year. This is the subtle point many readers skim past. After adding and subtracting interest and tax, Feyenoord ended the year with a net loss of 12.6 million euros. The club's equity was cut to 24.7 million euros. I will return to this equity figure later, because it is the single most important indicator of the club's capacity to absorb shocks. Overall, Feyenoord's financial structure reveals a club with a high fixed cost base but revenue that depends on two extremely volatile variables: European cup results and profit from player sales. European money: the valve of the whole system To understand why revenue lost more than 50 million euros, you have to understand why European money matters so much to a club like Feyenoord. According to the report, in the season before, Feyenoord reached the round of 16 of the UEFA Champions League. In the season being reported, the club exited at the league phase of the UEFA Europa League. The distance between those two milestones is not a matter of prestige, it is a matter of money. A place in the Champions League round of 16 brings enormous revenue: performance bonuses, television rights from the most prestigious competition in Europe, home ticket money for the big matches, sponsorship tied to appearing on the top stage. A Europa League campaign, respectable as it is, returns a far smaller share. That is why the same club, with virtually the same wage bill, can post business results tens of millions of euros apart. I call this the valve of the system. In the big leagues like the Premier League, domestic broadcast revenue is thick enough to act as a cushion, even when a team performs poorly in Europe. In the Eredivisie it is not. Dutch domestic revenue is small, so a Champions League place becomes the valve that determines the cash flow of an entire season. For Feyenoord, securing a Champions League place this season is not just a sporting target, it is a survival condition to offset the loss just announced. This also explains why the Feyenoord board expects revenue to rise sharply again next season. That expectation is not blind optimism; it is anchored to a concrete event: the Champions League ticket already secured. But it must be said clearly: an expectation of rising revenue does not mean the structural problem is solved. It only means that next year, if everything goes well, the club will have more room to breathe. Five names and the trap of the accounting profit In the reported financial year, Feyenoord sold five players: Dávid Hancko, Igor Paixão, Quilindschy Hartman, Antoni Milambo and Quinten Timber. This is a squad clear-out on a large scale, and it says a great deal about how the club operates. Look at this list through the eyes of someone who has followed Dutch football for years. Hancko is a highly rated centre-back, the kind of player who can operate in several defensive systems, the sort any big-league club would want. Paixão is a wide attacker full of pace and unpredictability, the type the top European leagues chase. Hartman is a young full-back, a product of the academy, representing Feyenoord's internal development model. Milambo is another young talent expected to grow in the club's colours. Timber is a central midfielder who can play several roles, an important link in the middle. Those five names are spread across the lines: defence, midfield, attack. That is a sign the club had to hollow out its squad systematically, not merely sell off a few surplus positions. And this is the moment to repeat a line I always carry in my professional pocket: a contract is the record of greed, but also the diary of hope. For the player, it is the hope of stepping up a tier. For the club, it is the hope of balancing the books. Both are real hopes, and both come at a price. But there is a trap I want to dissect carefully: the 9.4 million euro transfer profit. The figure looks good, but it is an accounting profit, not an equivalent cash flow. In modern football, transfer deals are rarely paid in one instalment. They are usually split into several payments, potentially stretching across financial years. They usually come with add-ons tied to performance, such as appearances, goals, trophies won by the buying club, or the future transfer value. This means the money Feyenoord actually receives in a given financial year can be far smaller than the headline total of the deals. And the 9.4 million euro profit is the result after deducting the amortisation of the contract values of the departed players. In other words, the club had bought Hancko, Paixão, Hartman, Milambo and Timber earlier, accounted for their value year by year, and when it sold them it recorded the difference between the sale price and the remaining book value. Those differences added up to 9.4 million euros. The transfer profit in a financial report is not cash in the vault, it is the accounting result of a chain of deals stretched over time. This is why selling five pillars was still not enough to save the club from a net loss. Had it not sold, the loss for the year would have been far larger. Selling players helped narrow the gap, but not enough to fill the hole left by the collapse in European revenue. I always remind my listeners of one thing: do not confuse accounting profit with cash flow. A club can report a profit on the books while still short of money to pay wages, and conversely can report a loss while holding abundant cash. European football is full of such stories, and they usually only surface when a club suddenly cannot pay wages at the end of the month. Equity of 24.7 million: a thin cushion Now let us return to the figure I promised. Feyenoord's equity was cut to 24.7 million euros. To understand why this figure deserves attention, place it beside the 115.2 million euro revenue. Equity is the club's financial cushion, the difference between assets and liabilities, the thing a club can draw on to absorb loss-making years. A cushion of 24.7 million euros for a club with more than 115 million euros of revenue is relatively thin, only about a fifth of revenue. Imagine what happens if Feyenoord has a second consecutive loss-making year of a similar scale. The 12.6 million euro net loss in one year already ate into half of the equity cushion. If next year repeats that scenario, the cushion will thin further, and the club will be forced to consider stronger measures: cutting costs, selling more players, or seeking fresh capital from its owners. In the Netherlands, clubs must comply with national federation licensing requirements, which include forward-looking financial plans. Equity still positive at 24.7 million euros shows Feyenoord has not entered the danger zone, but the safety margin has narrowed. A single annual loss does not automatically mean a breach of UEFA's financial sustainability rules, but it is a signal for regulators and the club itself to monitor more closely. For a club whose revenue structure depends on European cups, thin equity means the safety margin is only enough for one bad season, not two. Feyenoord in the European food chain There is a way of seeing things I learned after years working in France, where I had access both to the corridors of big clubs and to conversations with people working at lower levels of the game: European football is a food chain. At the top are clubs with hundreds of millions of euros of revenue from broadcast rights, commercial deals and stadiums. In the middle are clubs like Feyenoord: big enough to appear on the European stage, historic enough to have a brand, but without the resources to keep their best players when the giants come knocking. In that food chain, Feyenoord plays a dual role. First, the club is a talent nursery, developing players and selling them on at a higher price to the big leagues. Second, the club is a contender strong enough to fight for a Champions League place every season, but not strong enough to be guaranteed one. The two roles reinforce each other, but they also create a hard-to-escape loop. It is worth remembering that Ajax and PSV are in the same group competing for Champions League places with Feyenoord. These three clubs share the few places Dutch football gets in Europe's most prestigious competition. The report does not state the financial situation of Ajax or PSV, so I cannot compare directly. But structurally, all three depend on European money and transfer profits in similar ways. What stands out is that Feyenoord's greatest asset in this model is not the stadium or the broadcast rights, but its scouting network and academy. If the club sells five pillars, its ability to replace them depends on whether the scouting department can find young, cheap players of comparable quality. This is why a financial loss is not only an accounting story, but also a story about competitive capacity on the pitch in the years ahead. I have followed Feyenoord's matches in Europe across many seasons, and what I have observed is that the club's strength usually comes from collective identity rather than individual stars. But that collective identity needs time to build, and every time a batch of pillars is sold, the process has to start again. That is the sporting price of the stepping-stone model, a price that does not appear on the balance sheet but does appear on the league table. The blind spot of the official story At this point I want to raise a question the big headlines tend to avoid. The headline Feyenoord posts deep losses despite selling many players creates a certain image in the reader's mind: a club in crisis, an incompetent board, a team on the verge of collapse. But read the report closely and the picture is far more complex. The first blind spot lies in how the cause is read. The 12.6 million euro loss did not come from the club spending recklessly; it came from European revenue falling after a disappointing continental campaign. In other words, it is the consequence of a cyclical sporting variable, not a single mistaken financial decision. The board can be criticised for keeping too rigid a cost structure, but it cannot be accused of having burned money irresponsibly. The second blind spot lies in the phrase financial discipline used by finance director Pieter Smorenburg in his explanation. To a reader of rumours, that is an empty phrase. To a reader of reports, it is a signal. It shows the board intends to keep the wage bill under tight control, to spend selectively, and not to pour all the transfer money into new signings. This is a message aimed at both fans and regulators, and it is also a promise the board will have to keep. The third blind spot, and perhaps the most important, lies in how the stakeholders feel about the situation. For Feyenoord supporters, losing five pillars, including names who were attached to the club and loved from the stands, creates a sense of abandonment. That feeling is real, and it carries its own weight, even if it never appears on the balance sheet. For the board, selling players is an essential part of the business model, not a betrayal. For the coach, it is a tactical puzzle to solve without a full squad. The official story of a club in crisis conceals the fact that Feyenoord is operating exactly according to the logic of a stepping-stone club, where selling pillars is a condition for survival rather than a sign of decline. There is something I want to say plainly, even if it is not easy to hear for those who want a tidy conclusion. As someone who always seeks consensus, I still have to admit that a piece of writing with value sometimes leaves one side uncomfortable. The side that wants to hear the club is in crisis will not be pleased when I say the loss is largely the consequence of a poor European season. The side that wants to hear everything is fine will not be pleased when I say equity is thinning and the risk is real. The truth usually sits in between, and my job is to show it to you, not to please everyone. Social impact: the quiet workers Every time I read a financial report about a club, I ask myself a question few people pose: what do these numbers mean for the people working behind the scenes? That question came to me in the spring of 2026, when leagues around the world were suspended by the pandemic. I was in Paris then, and over a few days I received 23 calls from stadium cleaners, ticket sellers and seasonal workers afraid of losing their jobs. They were not players, had no lucrative contracts, never appeared on television. I put together a special three-hour programme, inviting player union representatives and a labour lawyer to discuss it. The programme drew 45,000 listeners and helped some clubs commit to paying seasonal staff. COVID-19 showed me that football cannot live without its quiet workers. I tell that story here because when Feyenoord announces a loss, and when the board speaks of financial discipline, that usually means something will be cut. My question is: what will be cut, and who will bear it? Will the club cut into the most visible costs, the player wage bill, or into the less noticed ones that affect the backroom workers? A stepping-stone club does not only sell players to survive; it sometimes has to tighten its belt in places the audience never sees. In my transfer writing, I always try to add a section I call social impact: how this deal affects backroom staff and local supporters. With Feyenoord, that is a question about a community bound to the club in Rotterdam, where football is part of the city's identity. When the team sells players the stands love, something is lost that no balance sheet can measure. I still remember sitting at De Kuip for a European match. The atmosphere there was unlike any modern stadium I have visited. The crowd sang without stopping, even when the home side was behind. After the match, I spoke with a street vendor outside the ground who had sold drinks and bread there for more than twenty years. He told me his greatest fear was not the team losing, but the team no longer playing in Europe, because then he would lose the income from those crowded nights. That is how football finance reaches lives we never see on the scoreboard. What lies ahead Feyenoord enters the new season with a Champions League ticket in hand and a balance sheet waiting to be healed. The board expects revenue to rise sharply again, and that expectation has a basis, provided the team survives in Europe long enough to collect matching prize money and broadcast revenue. But I want to close with a progressive thought, not a summary. The real question Feyenoord must answer is not how to plug this year's 12.6 million euro loss, but how to reduce its dependence on the two most volatile variables: European cup results and transfer profit. A stepping-stone club can live well on that model for years, but it always stands on a slope. One poor European season, or one batch of player sales that falls short of expectations, is enough to shake the whole system. What is worth pondering is that in the Netherlands, almost every club stands on that same slope. The question facing the whole of Dutch football is no longer how to sell players better, but how to build a more sustainable revenue base, enough that clubs like Feyenoord do not live and die by each European matchday. At 46, I no longer chase breaking news; I chase verified truth. And the verified truth here is that a club can play well, do things right, and still lose money. That is not a paradox. It is the nature of football in the middle tier of Europe, where every Champions League ticket is both a dream and a condition for survival.